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CARRIERS AND TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.
Cases selected by

OWEN WISTER.

CARRIERS.

i. Ejection of Passenger.
A passenger, occupying more than one seat in a railroad train, contrary to the rules of the company, and who resists any attempt of the
trainmen to confine him to a single seat by displaying a pistol, may be
removed from the train, whether other passengers were inconvenienced
or not: Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Moody, Court of Appeals of Texas,
STOREY, Special Judge, June 28, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., loo9.
2.

Injury to Passenger-Burdenof Proof.

Where, in an action for personal injuries, plaintiff alleged that by
reason of his bruises and hurts he was rendered delirious at times, and
defendant had the cause continued for a year, the latter was not entitled
to a c6ntinuantce to take the deposition of absent witnesses who would
testify that plaintiff was not rendered delirious, on the ground of surprise
occasioned by the deposition of a witness for plaintiff, wherein he stated
that plaintiff was rendered delirious by his injuries.
While a railroad company owes a very high dekree of care to its
passengers, to protect them from injury, yet the company is not an
insurer of their safety; and it is error to instruct the jury that if a train
in which a passenger was traveling left the track, and was derailed, and
the passenger was injured thereby, the company would be liable for such
injuries as were the direct and proximate result of such accident, unless
the derailment could not have been guarded against by human skill and
foresight, and wks caused by a defect unknown to the company.
The fact that a passenger was injured without fault on his part raises
no presumption of negligence of the carrier, and does not place upon the
latter the burden of proving that the injury was not caused by its
negligence: Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Buckalew, Court of Appeals of Texas,
PLEASANT, J., May II, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 994.

3.

Limitation of Liability.

The plaintiff shipped a car-load of goods, including some horses,
from Redding, Ill., to Chicago, over the C., S. F. & C. R. R., which
terminated in Chicago. He intended to have the property transported to
Lakefield, in Minnesota, and verbally agreed with the C-., S. F. & C. R. R.
Co. as to what the charge should be to that point. He, however, entered
into a written contract with that company merely for transportation to
Chicago for a specified price, and that a person, in behalf of the plaintiff,
should have passage with the car to take care of the property. Plaintiff
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sent a man with the car, givibig him money to pay the freight, but gaye
him no express authority to enter into any contract in his behalf. At
Chicago this agent, in behalf of his principal, contracted with the defend-ant for the further transportation from there to Lakefield, in which contract it was provided that no claim for loss or damage to the stock should
be valid, unless made in -writing within thirty days after the same should
. have occurred. After the car reached its destination, the defendant
retained possession a few days for non-payment of frdight. In an action
for alleged negligence in the care of one of the horses'after the transportation had ceased, held: (i) The above condition as to notice was applicable in respect to the carrier's conduct as a warehouseman, that relation
being properly incident to that. of carrier. (2) Such a contract, if
made by the owner, or if -authorized by him, is reasonable and valid.
(3)From the circumstances it must be inferred that the agent in charge
of the property was authorized to make any necessary and reasonable contract, as he did do, for its transportation from Chicago to Lakefield. For that purpose he stood in place of the owner: Armstrong v.
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., Supreme Court of Minnesota, DIcKINsON, J.,
May 5, 1893, 54 N. W. Rep., co62.

-

14. Who isa Passenger-Ejection.
A person who gets on the platform of an express carwithout having
purchased a ticket, and remains thereon, in violation of the company's
rules', for the purpose of being carried from one station to another, is not
a passenger.
The fact that a brakeman of such train, on discovering such person,
ac'cepts from the latter the required fare from the station where he got
on to his place of destination, does not constitute such person a passenger, since the fgrmer cannot waivethe rules of the company.
Where, in an action against a railroad company for wrongfully
ejecting plaintiff while a passenger, the gist of the complaint is the violation of the contract to 8arry, plaintiff cannot recover on the theory of the
use of unnecessary violence in effecting a rightful ejectment: Chicago &
E. R. Co. v. Field, Appellate Court of Indiana, REINHARD, J., June 1O,
1893, 34 N. W. Rep., 406.
CONNgCTING LINnS.

5.

Liabilityfor Stolen Baggage.

When a passenger buys a ticket from a carrier to a point, beyond its
line, which limits the carrier's liability to its own line, and the passenger
procures her baggage to be checked, and pays for the excessive weight
over ioo pounds, the carrier is not liable for property stolen from the
baggage before reaching its destination, but while on a connecting line:
"

Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v'. Ions, Court of Appeals of Texas, SToREY,
Special Judge, June 28, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., ioII.
TELEGRAPH CoMPANIS.

6. Failureto Deliver Message-Special Damages.
An attorney wired his clients: "Have you claim against P. L. D.?"
The latter replied: "Yes; one hundred and sixty-one dollars and fifteen
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cents." The delivery of the message and answer thereto was delayed
through negligence over four days, during which time plaintiffs' debtor
converted his property into cash and fled to parts unknown, thereby
preventing collection of the debt by legal attachment In an action
against the telegraph company it was held: (i) That the message, when
read in the light of well-known usage in commercial correspondence,-.
reasonably informed the operator of its importance and disclosed-the
transaction so far as was necessary to accomplish the purpose for which
it was sent, and that the measure of damages -was the loss occasioned to
the plaintiffs by reason of the failure to deliver the message. (2) That
it was no defence to the action that at the time the message was received
by the defendants a violent storm was raging at the other end of the
line, which prevented transmission, if the sender was not informed at
the time of the company's inability to transmit: Bierhaus v. Western
Union Tel. Co., Appellate Court of Indiana, June ao, IF93, TLo4rz, J., 34'
N. E. Rep., 581.

COMMERCIAL LAW.
Cases selected by

FRANCIS H. BOHLEN.

BILLS AND NOES.
i. Note Dated on Sunday-Evidence.
In an action on a note dated on Sunday, the burden is on plaintiff to
show that it was in fact executed bn a day which was not Sunday.
In an action by a bank on a note dated on Sunday, its "discount
register" is not admissible in evidence to show that the note in suit was
a renewal of a note which matured on Sunday, and that the renewal.
note was made on a certain week day after its date, and dated back to
the date of the maturity of the first note, according to the custom of the
bank: Hauerwas v. Goodloe, Supreme Court of Alabama, June 15, 1893,
STONE, C. J., 13 So. Rep., 567.
CHECKS.
2.

FictitiousPayee.

Where a check is drawn, payable to a person under a fictitious name,
in payment for property which it afterwards appears he has stolen, and
the bank at which it is payable certifies the check, a bank which subsequently cashes 'such check, on its being indorsed by the payee with his
fictitious name, acquires a valid title thereto, which it can enforce
against the certifying bank; it appearing that, though the payee acted
all through under a fictitious name, yet the check was received by the
identical person to whom its drawer intended to deliver it, and was by
him indorsed in the name in which it was issued to him, and he, as was
intended by the drawer, received the benefit of it: 33 N. B. Rep., 247,
affirmed: Meridan National Bank of Indianapolis v. Shelbyville National
Bank, Appellate Court of Indiana, June 24, 1893, GAVIN, C. J., 34 N. R.
Rep., 6o8.
69
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CORPORATIONS.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMNTS.
3. Notice bDishonor.
In a city of less than io,ooo inhabitants, not having free mail
delivery, and which is not within Code, 1777, permitting notice of dishohor to be given by mail, although the indorser and holder live in the
"same town, personal notice must be given.
By the law merchant, personal notice of dishonor need not be given
presently and directly to the indorser, but the notice may be left with
any person in charge of his place of business, whether such person is
'his agent or not, or with any person found oni and belonging to the place
where he resides, apparently capable of transmitting the notice to the
indorser. Hence, failure to give notice of the dishonor of a note at the
indorser's residence is not excused by the fact that an agent of the bank
in casually passing the indorser's house at 6 P.M. found no lights in the
windows and saw no one in the house; such agent not stopping at the
house or niaking any inquiry as to whether the indorser was in: Isabel
v..Lewis, Supreme Court of Alabama, McCLuLLAN, j., june 7, 1893, 13
So. Rep., 33g.
PRINCIPAL AND AGNT.
4. Powers of Agents.
"Defendant transportation company adopted a resolution that F "is
hereby authorized to take full charge of the company's business, and to
enter into such negotiations and contracts as he thinks best for the company's interest." Held, that F was authorized to appoint a local agent
with power to hire a barge for defendant, and agree that, if not returned
in as good condition as when hired, defendant would pay the agreed
value of the barge, as upon a purchase.
Where defendant's general agent introduced to plaintiffs its local
agent, saying that any transactions had with him would be approved by
defendant, defendant Cannot relieve itself from liability on a. contract
made by such agent with plaintiffs by showing that it was in excess of
his powers. Bvidence that the alleged agent had made contracts of a
similar character, as such agent, which were ratified by defendant, is
admissible: Tennessee River Trans. Co. v. Kavanaugh, Supreme Court
of Alabama, May 23, 1893, STOND, C. J., x3 So. Rep., 283.

CORPORATIONS.
Cases selected by LIwis LAWRENCE SMITH.
ACTIONS AGAINST CORPORATIONS.
I. By Stockholders.
Before a stockholder in a corporation can maintain an action in his
own name to obtain a remedy for wrongs committed against the corporation, it must appear that .he has in good faith, but without success,
attempted to secure action by the directors or managing officers of the
corporation, or that demand for their action would be unavailing:
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Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Board of Commissioners, Supreme Court
of Kansas, JOHNSTON, J., June 1o, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 312.

A minority of stockholders will not be permitted to displace corporate
authority and contiol by substituting therefor the policy, management
and control of the courts, except in plain cases of such fraud and malad-

ministration as work manifest oppression and wrong to them; and, before
calling on the court to take into its hands the management of corporate affairs, it must be made clearly to appear, not only that such
oppression and wrong is being done, but that every reasonable effort has
been made to secure redress, and prevention of further mischief, within

the corporation itself, citing Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S., 45o: Roman
v. Woolfolk, Supreme Court of Alabama, HEAD, J., May 16, 1893, i So.
.Rep., 212.
CONSOLIDATION.
2.

"Who May Object to

Where several railway companies have entered into articles of agreement for consolidation, and have observed the forms of the statute in such
organization, and filed the articles of agreement with the Secretary of
State, and the consolidated company has for a considerable time assumed
to be and to act as a corporation, an inquiry into the validity or nonexistence of the consolidation can only be brought by the proper prosecuting officer" in the name of the State: Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Board of Commissioners, sufira.
INsoIrvNcY.

3. Preference of Officers.
The directors of an insolvent corporation, who are creditors of the
same, cannot, while they continue in the control of its affairs and assets,
take any advantage of their position to secure preference or advantage
for themselves over other creditors, but aust share ratably with the other
general creditors in a distribution of the company's assets.
In this case a director had nominally resigned, but continued in'
active direction. It was left to the jury to say whether he was still a
director: Hays v. Bank, Supreme Court of Kansas, JOHNSTON, J., June
10, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 318.
4. Mortgage in Contemplationof.
A New York manufacturing corporation removed to New Jersey, and
executed a chattel and real estate mortgage on property in New Jersey,
to resident creditors, to secure the payment of debts contracted and pay-

able there, which mortgage was valid in New Jersey, and under the particular statute of New York, under which the corporation was created.
Such mortgage was held not to be invalid because the execution thereof
was contrary to a general statute of .New York, inhibifing such corporations from transferring their property to stockholders, officers, or creditors thereof, in contemplation of insolvency: Boehme v. Roll, Court
of Chancery of New Jersey, GREEN, V. C., May 22, 1893, 26 Atl. Rep.,
832
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CORPORATIONS.

TINGS.

5: By-Laws.
If the charter or by-laws of a corporation fix the time and place at
which regular meetings shall be held, this is itself sufficient notice to
stockholders, and no further notice is necessary: Morrill v. Little Falls
Mfg. Co., Supreme Court of Minnesota, MITCHELL, J., June I, 1893, 55
•N.-W. Rep., 547.
NATIONAL BANKS.

6. Rights of Transfereesof Slock.
An action was brqught against the agent for the shareholders of a
national bank to recover apro ratashare of the surplus, after payment
of the bank's debts. The act of Congress of June 3o ,187.6, 3, authorizes the comptroller, when all the debts of an insolvent national bank
have been paid, except to "shareholders who are creditors" thereof, to
notify the shareholders to meet and elect an agent, who shall receive
from the comptroller or receiver the remaining assets, and dispose of
them for the shareholders' benefit, distributing the same among the latter "in proportion to the shares held by each." It was held that, where
a shareholder of an insolvent national bank failed to pay an assessment
of less'than the par value, made by the comptroller, a purchaser for value
of the former's shares was not entitled to participate in the equitable,
distribution by such agent of money collected and turned over to him
by the comptroller after the assessment was made, until the shareholders
-who paid the assessment were first reimbursed; and,
.The fact that such purchasex obtained such shares
at sherift's sale on
execution in favor of such insolvent bank, and against the former holder
of the shares, did not entitle such transferee to participate in su~h fund,
since the denial of such right does not conflict with the provision giving
a transferee of such shares all rights of the prior holder, and the doctrine
of estoppel does not ap'ply.
McIvE4, C. J., dissented, on the grounds (i), that, there being no
lien on the shares (Bullard v. Bank, i8 Wall., 589), the default of the
former holder was personal, and its effects could not be visited on the
transferee; and (2), that the agent could not set up the defence in favor
- of the other shareholders, who were not parties to the suit: Richardson
v. Wallace, Supreme Court of South Carolina, PoPm, J., April 24, 1893,
17 S. . Rep., 725.
7. Set-off.
An assignment bya stockholder in aninsolvent national bank, of his
claim against the bank, before the.direction of the comptroller to enforce
-his liability, but after the insolvency of the bank, does not affect the
right to set off his liability against the dividend' due on his claim, nor does
the fact that the comptroller, at the time of the assignment, had not
. determined the amount necessary to be collected from the stockholders
for the payment of the creditors. It is sufficient that such direction has
been given, and amount so determined, when the set-off is made: King
v. Armstrong, Supreme Court of Ohio, WILLIAMS, J., April 25, 1893, 34
N. X Rep., 163 .

-
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PEcnuGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS.
8. Decisionsof Stupreme Judicatory.
The decisions of the supreme judicatory of a religious denomination
of the associated class, having a constitution and governed by local
district, State and national bodies, are not conclusive upon the courts,
when they are in open and avowed defiance, and in express violation,, of
the constitution of such body. Watson v. Jones, i3 Wall., 679, distinguished: Brundage v. Deardof, Circuit Court, Northern District of Ohio,
TAFT, C. J., May 12, 1893, 55 Fed. Rep., 839.
9. Change of Doctrine-Minority.
Where the conditions under which a religious society is formed, and
its property acquired, require adherence to a particular creed or system
of doctrine and church polity, a minority of the membership may insist
upon carrying out the purposes for which the society was organized, and
a majority will not be permitted to divert the common property to other
uses, or to use it for the support and maintenance of doctrines or a polity
essentially at vdriance with its original constitution. The trust must be
administered substantially in accordancewith the intention of the original
founders.
But changes in matters of form in the conduct of the worship, or in
the administration of the ordinances, not affecting the substance of doctrine or discipline, may be made by congregations, and determined by a
majority of the numbers entitled to vote, in the absence of any other
lawfully established rule: Schrady v. Dornfeld, Supreme Court of
Minnesota, VANDERBOUGH, J., March x3, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 49.

,
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STOCK.

io.

IllegalIssue.

A sale by a corporation of stock illegally issued, and the delivery of
a certificate therefor, to an innocent third person, who pays cash therefor, violates the vendor's warranty of the existence and validity of the
thing sold, and entitles the vendee to recover the price: Lincoln v. New"
Orleans E xp. Co., Lim., Supseme Court of Louisiana, FBNNR, J., May
8, 1893, 12 So. Rep., 937.
Si.

Transfer-Proof.

Where stock is transferable only on the books of the corporation,
the person in whose name the stock stands on such books is entitled to
vote it, and the books of the company are conclusive upon the question,
as to who is entitled to vote stock legally issued: Morrill v. Little Mfg.
Co., Supreme Court of Minnesota, MiTc ELL, J., June 1, 1893, 55 N. W.
Rep., 547.
TAXATION.
12. Investments Out of State.
Where the entire capital of a domestic corporation is invested in
patent rights, and it grants the right to use such patents to other corporations, some of which are formed within and some without this State,
and in consideration of such grants it receives and holds in this State

-
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stocks of the latter 6orporations and the dividends thereon, the capital of
such domestic corporation, to the extent of the stock of the foreign c6rporations held.by it, is not "employed within this State," so as to make
*it taxable under liws of New York; but where such domestic corporation holds bondg of foreign corporations issued to it in payment for the
patent rights granted, the capital thus inyested is taxable, since such
bonds have their situs at the domicile of the owner, unless kept employed
- outside the State: People ex -el. Bdison Blectric Light Co. v. Comp"troller, Court of Appeals of New York, EAR.6 J., June 20, 1893, 34 N. R.
* Rep,, 379.

'CRIMINAL LAW.
cases selected by ROBuRT J. BYRON.
BETTING.

i. Baseball Game.
Baseball is a game of skill, within the meaning of Mansf. Dig. 1835,
making it! a criminal offence to bet on such a game.: Mace v. State,
Supreme Court of Arkansas, POwEL,, J. (BATrTL- and MANSfieD, JJ.,
dissenting), July I, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 1io8.
PiLAcOIC.
2.

-

-

Extradition-HabeasCorfpus.

Where one is arrested on an executive warrant in extradition proceedings, the validity of the indictment under which he is charged by the
demoding State will not be tried on habeas corpus: Pearce v. State,
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, SImKINS, J., June 23, 1893, 23 S. W.
Rep.,. x5.
3. Indefinite Sentence.
In passing sentence on a person convicted of an offence, the court
has no power to provide that the imprisonment of the defendant shall
begin at- some future, indefinite time, depending on the happening of a
contingency; and an arrest under such conviction, made after the expiration of the term of imprisonment named in the sentence, is illegal: In re
Strickler, Supreme Court of Kansas, ALLEN, J., July 8, 1893, 33 Pac.
Rep., 620.
4. Sunday Laws.
Under Code, 4578, it is no justification for the running of a freight
train on Sunday that the company-has issued general rules and orders to
its employes not to do so, without also showing, either directly or by circumstances, such as calling upon employes to account for their misconduct, that in the particular instance the rules or orders were violated
without the sanction or connivance of the officer being one of those
whose duty it was to control the running of the train in question : Heard
v. State, Supreme Court of Georgia, July 3, 1893, PER CURIAM, 17 S. B.
Rep, iOo.

EQUITY-EVIDINCE.
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EQUITY.
Cases selected by

ROBERT P. BRADFORD.

PLEADING.

i. Sup lemental and Cross Bills-New Matter.
A cross bill is one brought by a defendant in a suit against the complainant in the same suit, or against other defendants in the same suit, or
against both, touching the matters in question in the original bill, and is
considered as an auxiliary suit, or as a dependency upon the original
bill, and can be sustained only on matter growing out of the original bill.
Such cross bill may set up new matter arising subsequently, but still it
must constitute part of the same defence, or relate to the same subjectmatter in such a way as to be a defence to the original suit.
A supplemental bill is considered merely as an addition to the
original bill, and, while it is often permissible and proper to introduce
matter that has occurred after the institution of the suit, and of such a
nature as cannot be properly the subject of an amendment, yet such new
matter must not be such as to change the rights and interests of the
parties before the court: Ledwith v. City ofJacksonville, Supreme Court
of Florida, MABRY, J., June 14, 1893, 13 So. Rep., 454.
PRACTICE.

2.

Bill of Discovery-FraudulntConveyance.

A bill in equity stated that plaintiffs were judgment creditors of
defendants; that they had sued out executions which had been returned
Ino property found ;" that plaifntiffs had reason to believe that defendants were beneficially interested in certain goods, -securities and other
property placed beyond the reach of their creditors. Plaintiffs claimed
full discovery of all such property and things in action. Held, that
while the court will set aside a fraudulent conveyance so as to subject the
property to execution, yet in the absence of any statute authorizing such
a proceeding, it will not compel a debtor to disclose his assets or compel
him to apply his assets to the payment of a judgment against him. Textbooks criticized. 22 S. W. Rep., 227, reversed: Cprgill v. Kountze,
Supreme Court of Texas, GAINES, J., June 24, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., iois.

EVIDEN.CE.
Cases selected by HENRY N. SMALTZ.
DyiNG DECLARATIONS.

i.

Admissibility of.

On an issue as to the admissibility of statements by, deceased as
dying declarations, the physician who attended deceased testified that he
saw that the wound was fatal, and said to a third person, in the hearing
of deceased, that "all the shot had gone to the hollow," on -which
remark deceased made no comment. Another witness testified to a conversation with deceased on the day of his death, in -which the latter did
not state who shot him, or what he expected to be the result of the
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injuries, and made no statement as to how he felt, except that "he was
not suffering so much." Held, that it did not appear that the statements
of deceased were made 'nder a sense of impending death: Blackburn v.
, State, supreme Court of Alabama, June 7, 1893, HARALSON, J., .13 So.
Rep., 274.

-

•
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NiOVATION.
2. ParolEvidence of-Statute of Frauds.
" A brought suit against B, alleging that C was indebted to A for
-wages; that B purchased C's business, out of which the debt arose, and
'in part consideration agreed to pay C's debt to A; that this agreement
was omitted from an instrument in the form of a receipt, set out in the
petition, ,and containing other terms of the transfer; and that the
omission was to prevent a third person from learning of the promise.
Held, that the petition stated a cause of action.
Such a promise, omitted from a written agreement, may be proved
by parol, where the promisee was induced to execute the writing on the
faith of the oral promise.
Such a.promise is not within the Statute of Frauds: Bartlett'v. Pratt,
Supreme Court of Nebraska, June 29, 1893, IRvINE, C., 55 N. W. Rep.,
1050.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW.
Cases selected by MAYNE iR.LONGsTRZTH.
ATTORNnvs."
I. Admission to the Bar-Rightsof Women.
Constitutional and statutory provisions that every person of good
moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to the bar,
atid shall, on applicatioil, 'be admitted on prescribed conditions, do not
exclude women from the practice of law; there being no common law
inhibition; and it being provided by the Constitution that no privileges
shall be granted to any citizen which shall not, on the same terms,
belong to all citizens. There being no rules providing for the admission
Qf women to the bar, the Court has power to prescribe them: In re
Leach, Supreme Court of Indiana, HACKNEY, J., June 14, 1893, 34 N. R.
Rep., 641.
BRIMGXS.
Construction of Inter-county and Ii;tra-counlyBridges-Liability of Counties.
Where the County Commissioners of the several counties are by
statute authorized "to rebuild any bridge over any stream or river running into or through any county, or wheresuch bridge crosses a stream
forming the boundary line between two counties, then the commissioners
of the county in which said bridge is located, or the commissioners of
the respective counties where the stream or river runs between counties,
are hereby authorized to rebuild" it; in such case the legislature
2.
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intended to provide for only two classes of bridges, those wholly within
one county, and those partly in one county and partly in another. As to
the first class it is the duty of the County Commissioners of the county
to repair the bridge; as to the second class, the commissioners of the
respective counties are required to do so jointly. A stream is equally
the boundary, whether the line is at its middle or at its edge; and a
stream is equally between two counties, whether it is all in one or half
in each. Therefore, a county whose limits commence on "the west side
of" a stream, is jointly liable with the other county for the construction
or repair of a bridge over said stream: Keiser v. Commissioners of
Union County, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, MITCHELL, J., July 17,
1893, 156 Pa., 315; 32 W. N. C., 454; 26 At1. Rep., io66.
CONSPIRACY.
3. Combinationsof Wholesalers- Validity of Contracts.
Any -man (unless under contract obligation, or unless his employment charges hii- with some public duty) has a right to refuse to work
for or deal with any man, or class of men, as he sees fit, and this right
which one man may exercise singly, any number may agree to exercise
jointly. It can never be a crime to combine to commit a lawful act, but
it may be a crime for several to combine to commit an unlawful act,
which, if done by one individual alone, although unlawful, would not be
criminal: Bohn Manufacturing Company v. Hollis, Supreme Court of
Minnesota, MITCHELL, J., July 20, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 1119. Following Cam. v. Hunt., 4 Metc., iii; Steamship Co. v. McGregor, L. R.
(1892), App. Cas., 25; Carew v. Rutherford, lo6 Mass., i.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

4. Licenses-City Council.
Under the police power of the State, the legislature may confer
upon municipalities the right to determine, in licensing the sale' of.
intoxicants, the places where saloons maybe kept, and to determine that
question on each application. And under such conferred right the City
Council is emppwered to pass an ordinance requiring an application for
a license to be made to Common Council, and conferring upon the
council power to determine each individual application as far as the
location and suitableness of the saloon were concerned: Sherlock v,
Stuart, Supreme Court of Michigan, GRANT, J. (McGRATH and LoNG,
JJ., dissenting), June 25, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 845.
5. License Laws.
Where an applicant for a distiller's license complies with all the
requirements of the Act of June 9, 1891, relating to the granting of such
license, and no remonstrance or objections of any kind were filed or
made against the granting of the license, the court can not arbitrarily,
and without any expression of opinion, refuse a li'ense. For though
the court has the power to consider the question of the necessity of the
license for the accommodation of the public and the fitness of the
applicant for the grant of the license, the refusal upon either of these
grounds is not to be a merely arbitrary refusal, but only such a
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refusal as is the result of an opinion to be formed after aue regard has
been given to the number and characterof thepetitioners for and against
the application: In re Johnson's License, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, GRZEN, J., July 19, 1893, 26 AtI. Rep., io66; 156 Pa., 322; 32 W.
N. C., 503.
.'1' MUXCIPAI CORPORiATIONS.
6. Contract-PrivateCapacity.
A permit given by a city to a lot owner to construct and use a vault
undcer the alley in the rear of his lot, and a bond given by him conditioned upon his saving the city harmless fromloss on account of such
vault, and keeping the alley'above it in good repair, constitute a contract; and if the existence aid use of the vault do not interfere with the
public interest in the alley, it is a contract with the city acting in .a
private capacity, and, therefore, irrevocable by the city: Gregsten v.
City of Chicago, Supreme Court of Illinois, SHoPL:, J., June I9, 1893,
34 N. R. Rep., 426.
7. Ordinancesand Resolutions-Paymentof Rewards.
When the charter of a cit' forbids the passage of orders and resolutiont by councils without presentation to the mayor for his approval, this
does not authorize legislation by order and resolution, or extend the range
of subjects to which such action is applicable.. It merely resolves a doubt
*asto the validity of resolutions made by the councils in cases proper for
such action; and such resolutions remain as they always were, of a temporary character, as distinguished from an ordinance which prescribes a
permanent rule of conduct or government. Therefore a joint resolution
of the councils of Lancaster authorizing the mayor to offer a reward for
the conviction of any person starting incendiary fires in the city, but
which was not submitted to the mayor for. approval, is of a temporary
character, passed for a ptesent emergency, and will not sustain an action
for a reward seventeen years after its passage and ten years after its last
proclamation by the mayor. Its terms ceased to bind the city after the
lapse of a reasonable time, and while in determing the reasonableness,
the reason or necessity for the action must be taken into account, ordiharily such a resolution will not be binding beyond the term of the
mayor to whom the order is directed: Shaub v. City of Lancaster, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, WIrLjArs, J., July 19, 1893, 32 W. N. C.,
566; 26 Atl. Rep., io67; 156 Pa., 362.
8.

Water Rents-Uniformity.

fater rates levied by a city need not be uniform, since they are not
taxes levied by the city in its public capacity, but compensation for
water furnished by the city in its private capacity.
Therefore an
ordinance fixing water rates for small consumers at so much per room,
and for large consumers according to the amount consumed as
measured by meters, thereby' decreasing slightly the rates paid by
small consumers, and increasing materially the rate paid by large consumers, under a former ordinance, is not unreasonable, where it does
not appear that the imposition of water rates upon large consumers is

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

1o87

not entirely equitable, as between different individuals of that class,
or that the small consumers are not required to pay rates relatively as
high as those imposed upon, the large consumers: Wagner v. City
of Rock Island, Supreme Court of Illinois, BAiLBY, C. J., June I9, 1893,
34 N. E. Rep., 545PUBLIC

OFFICERS.

OfficialAdvertisin-Recoveryof CommissionsPaidby Aewspapers.
Public officers who do not make an effort to discover what is the
lowest price for which official advertising could be done, but pay the
maximum price allowed by law for having such advertising done, and
demand and receive from the proprietor of the newspaper inserting the
advertisement, as a condition precedent to awarding such contract, a commission of 40 per cent., are informed by this very arrangement that the
work could be done for 40 per cent. less, and are guilty of embezzlement
for appropriating the commissions. And if the proprietors of the paper
knew the purpose of the transaction they would be equally as guilty as
the officers for assisting in 'the violation of a public duty whereby the
commonwealth was injured, and in the unlawful conversion of public
money to private use. The commonwealth could recover the amount of
the commissions in assumpsit.
Even if- the persons who make the arrangement are not known by
the proprietors to be the agents of the public officers, still if the advertising was manifestly official and could not be mistaken for an item of private business, and if the persons empowered by law to select the newspapers for the advertising are two certain officials, then the proprietors
are bound with knowledge of these facts and also with knowledge of such
other facts as the inquiry which these required them to make Would have
disclosed. The proprietors neglected to inquire, and such negligent con-"
duct must be held to be the legal equivalent of guilty conduct, and a
recovery may be had from such proprietors. The form of action should
be trespass, and the measure of damages is the amount ofmoney ofwhicl
the commonwealth was wrongfully deprived, with interest, not as inter-.
est but as compensation for the delay of which the rate of interest affords
the fair legal measure: Commonwealth v. Press Co., Limited, Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, !EER CURIAM, July 19, 1893, x56 Pa., 516; 26 Atl.
Rep., 1035; 32 W. N. C., 56i. Following Mayor v. Lever, 25 Q. B. D.,
363.
9.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE.
Cases selected by ARDEMUS

STEWART.

PLEADING.
FEDERAL COURTS.

i. Conspiracy-Jurisdiction.
Before persons can be held to answer in the federal courts for conspiracy, they must be charged with combining and conspiring to effect
a purpose expiessly forbidden by some statute of the United States, or
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with doing some act in furthering the conspiracy, which is expressly forbiddez by a law of thle United States; and where a petition claims damages for an alleged conspiracy to disbar plaintiff from practising law in
the State courts because he has filed a bill in a federal court charging
defendants with misconduct and corruption in certain litigation pending
in a State court, no cause'of action is made out: Gieen v. Rogers, Circuit
. Court of the District of Colorado, RINgR, Dist. J., June 3, 1893, 56 Fed.

Rep.,

220.

PRACTICE.
INSANITY.

S

2.

Inquisition-Appeal.

* The petitioner in a proceeding to have a person adjudged of unsound
-mind has no such right that he can- appeal from a judgment of sanity :
Studabaker v. Markley, Appellate Court of Indiana, LoTz, J., June 21,
T893, 34 N. E. Rep., 6o6.

3.

Mandamus. to Compd Exercise of Jurisdction-Disualification-Interest.

The finding of a probate judge that he is disqualified, because of
interest, to exercise jurisdiction of a case, is not conclusive, but his
competency may be tried on a petition for mandamus: Medlin v. Taylor,
Judge, Supreme Court of Alabama, McCLELLAN, J., May 25, 1893, 13.
So. Rep., 3io.,
JURORS.

4.

,

*

Competency of

In ,a personal damage case against a railway a juror stated in his.
examination on his voir dire, in substance, that he had an elevator on
the line of railway, and was engaged in the business of buying and
shipping grain over the railroad; that he had received favors from the
railway company, and desired to retain the favorable consideration of'
the company; that he had no persbnal feeling in the matter, and could
render a fair and impartial verdict. Held, that a challenge, for Lause
was properly sustained; that a fair trial can only be had where the jurors
are absolutely free, impartial and independent: Omaha & Rep. Val. R.
R. Co. v. Cook, Supreme Court of Nebraska,,MAxwmTL, C. J., June 3o,
1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 943A juror who states that he has formed an opinion as to the guilt of
the accused, from talking with a witness for the State, but that he can
disregard that opinion, and render a verdict in accordance with the law
and the testimony adduced on the trial, is a competent juror; State v.
b ugay, 35 La. Ann., 327, affirmed: State v. Covington, Supreme Court
of Louisiana, McENERY, J., June 14, 1893, 13 So. Rep., 266.
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Cases selected by WILIAM A. DAvis.
DEED.

x.

Charge on Land-How Divested-Sheriff's Sale-R&ght of
Divorced Wife-Furchaserof Portion-Liability
for Whole
Charge.
Plaintiff and her husband deeded land subject to the payment of
interest on $P150to the grantors annually, during their joint lives, and
to plaintiff "during her life, if she survives her said husband." On the
same day their grantee reconveyed the premises, subject to the same
charge, to plaintiff's husband, who remained in possession until ousted
by sheriff's sale. Held, that as the deed indicated that the charge-was
intended to run with the land until the death of plaintiff and her husband, it was not divested by the sheriff's sale.
Plaintiff's rights became vested by the execution of such deeds, and
were not thereafter dependent on the relation between her and her husband, though at the time of his death she had been divorced from him
on her own petition.
The lien of such charge extended, as to the.whole thereof, to every.
part of the land, and could not be apportioned on a division of the land.
without the. consent of the parties for whose benefit it vas created, so
that in the absence of any such agreement by plaintiff, she could collect
the interest due on the whole sum charged, from the owner of any portion of the land: Blank v. Kline, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, PER
CURIAM, May 31, 1893, 26 AtI. Rep., 692; 155 Pa., 613.
Grantee in Habendum not ieaned in Premises.
Where a person is named in the premises of a deed as grantee, without.words of inheritance, and in the habendum he is again named as
grantee, together with another person, not named in the premises, with
words of inheritance as to both, the provisions of the habenduin will
control, and each of the persons will take an estate in fee in the land:
McLeod v. Tarrant, Supreme Court of South Carolina, POPE, J., and
McGowAN, J. (McIvFR, C. J., dissenting), May 23, 1893, 17 S. E. Rep.,.
773.
2.

E QUITABLE ESTATE OF WIFE.

3. Curtesy, when Barred.
A conveyance in trust for the sole and separate use of a married
woman, with covenants that the trustee will permit her to enjoy the"
premises, rents and'profits, free from her husband's control, debts, curtesy and all other interests, and that at her death he will dispose of the
property as she shall direct, vests in her an equitable estate of inheritance, which, on her death intestate, descends to her heir free from the
curtesy of the husband.
A husband is entitled to curtesy in the equitable estate of his wife,
of which she died seised, although such estate was limited to her separate 'ise, except in those States where the estate of curtesy has been
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abpfiheil by statute; While it is not cdmpetent at common law, in the
- ranttd a.woman of an estate of inheritance, to exclude her husband
from is right of curtesy, a like rule does not prevail in equity, where
an estate may be so limited as to give the wife the inheritance, and
deprive the husband of curtesy, if the intent of the devisoi or settlor be
express.
Stich was the evident intention expressed in the above conveyance:
McTigue v. McTigue, Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. I, BRACR,
, , Miy 22, 1893, "22 S. W. Rep., 5oi.
MOLTGAGZ.
-4. G
Civen to Secure PromissoryNote-Foreclosure-Limitaon.
'Where a promissory note secured by a mortgage is barred by the
statute of limitations, an action to ioreclose the mortgage cannot be
maintained: Culp v. Culp, Supreme Court of Kansas, JOHNSTON, J.,
May 6, 1893, 32 Pac. Rep., iiI.
'RAi",ROA

, ,

•

,.

CONSTRUcTION.

Obstrudion of Highway-Damages to Owner of Abutting
Property.

Where i railroad company, under a city ordinanqe or the statute,
c6nstruets and operates its road in a street or highway, but leaves
sufficient space between the road-bed and abutting land or lots for ordinary vehicles, teams -and travel, there is no such obstruction of access to
abutting land or lots as to permit damages for any depreciation in value
thereof.
If a railroad company, in constructing its road and surfacing its
track, makes holes or other temporary obstructions in a stredt.or highway, an abutting lot or land owner may recover all special damages
suffered by him prior to the commencement of -his action; but on
account of such defects or obstructions in the street or highway he
cannot recover for the supposed depreciation in value of his property
upon the ground of a permanent appropriation for the right of way:
Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Union Inv. Co., Supreme Court of Kansas,
HORTON, C. J., June io, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 378.
6.

Right of IVay-Conz'eyance-Easement-Dower.

Though Laws 1849, p. 219, incorporating a railroad, and Laws 1851,
p. 272, amendatory thereof, authorize the road to take the feesimple or
other title to land, provide for its taking voluntary relinquishments of
the right of way, and in case of a refusal to relinquish the right of way
give the right to condemn it, in which proceedings an order shall be made
vesting in the company "the fee-simple title of the land," still the
evident scope of the acts being simply to have the land either relinquished or taken for the purpose of a railroad, the company will take,
even under a deed purporting to convey the fee, only the easement of a
right of way.
A widow, not being dowable of an easement, would have no dower
in the land which her husband by an absolute deed, in which she did not
join, conveyed for a right of way.
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The charter, by providing for relinquishment of the right of way by
the "owner," impliedly makes it unnecessary for the wife to join in the
conveyance by reason of her inchoate right of dower, and it makes no
difference that the husband does not convey directly to the railroad, but
by mesne conveyances: Chouteau v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., Supreme
Court of Missouri, Division No. 2, SHERWOOD, J. (GANTT, 1. J., dissenting), March 14, 1893, 22 S. W. Rep., 458.

TORTS.
Cases selected by AiEXANDER DURnIN LAUER.
MALICIOUS INTERFERRNCE.

i.

Breach of Contract.

An action will not lie against one who maliciously, but without violence, deceit, fraud, or benefit to himself, procures a breach of contract
between others.
The complaint allego' that the defendant maliciously, and with
intent to annoy the plaintiff, caused and procured plaintiff's landlord to
demand that plaintiff vacate his ldgings. A demurrer to the complaint
was sustained: Boyson v. Thorn, Supreme Court of California, HAvNES,
C., June 12, 1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 492.
NEGIGENCE.

2. Electric Wire-Injury from Charged Wires- Proximate
Cause.
Where a telephone company has permission from an electric light
company to string its wires along the latter's poles when the teleplione
company wishes to connect a residence where it has no poles, and the
telephone company disconnects a residence, and, instead of removing
the wire, coils it up, and hangs it on an electric light pole, the telephone
company is bound to look after the wire; and if it fail to do so, and the
electric light company remove the pole, and hang the wire on a telephone pole, where it Lecomes charged with electricity from an electric
light wire, and injures a pedestrian on the sidewalk, the negligence of
the telephone company is the proximate cause of the accident: Ahern v.
Oregon Telephone Co., Supreme Court of Oregon, LORD, C. J., June 19,
1893, 33 Pac. Rep., 403.
3. Licensee-PersonalInjury.
Where the president of a corporation grants a request of a teacher
for permission for a clasi of thirty or more pupils to visit the company's
power house for the purpose of viewing the machinery, such pupils are
mere licensees, to whom the company owes no duty to provide against
the danger of accident.
Where one of such pupils, while inspecting such machinery in company with the class and teacher, stepped into an open and unprotected
vat of hot water located where he was unable to see it, the company is
not liable for damages for failure either to warn him of the existence and
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danger of the vat, or to protect it by cover or railing, or to sufficiently
light. the building to' enable him to see it: Benson v. Baltimore Traction
Co., Court of Appeals of Maryland, ROBERTS, J., June 21, 1893, 26 AUt.
*Rep., 973. "
4.

Master and Servant-Defective Machinery-Knowledge of
Defects.
In an action by an employee for personal injuries caused by a defective hand wagon in use about defendant's works, the jury was authorized
-o infer, from the evidence and instructions, that plaintiff had, prior, to
the injury, learned of the alleged defects. rteld, that it was error to also
charge, in the absence of notice to defendant of such defects, that plaintiff had a right to presume that the wagon was in a reasonably safe condition, and that, though he had known it was out of repair, he had a
right to presume that defendant would use reasonable diligence in repair. ing it: Penna. Co. v. Burgett, Appellate Court of Indiana, DAvis, J.
(LoTz, J., dissenting), June 24, 1893, 34 N. E. Rep., 65o.
s.

Oil Escapingfrom Cars.

A complaint whict alleged that defendant negligently ran its train
filled with oil over its track, which was defective, and at a rate of speed
forbidden by ordinance, and that the train was wrecked thereby, and the
-oilflowed on to plaintiffs premises and caught fire, and. destroyed her
property, states a cause of action against defendant without additional
-proof that defendant was guilty of some act of wilful negligence in firing
the oil, or that its management was such as would naturally result in
such injury: Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Lowder, Appellate Court of
Indiana, DAvis, J., June 6, 1893, 34 N. E. Rep., 447.
TROVER.

6. Receivers.
Trover may be brought against a receiver, as such, without leave of
court, in a case where he sells property as under a mortgage which was
not so included; the question of good faith or knowledge not being
essential : Kenney v. Ranney, Supreme Court-of Michigan, HOOKgR,
C..J., July 26, 1893, 55 N. W. Rep., 982.

